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FEES AND ALLOWANCES TO ATTORNEYS IN
BANKRUPTCY AND CHAPTER XI
PROCEEDINGS
WILLIA3 J. RUDIN*
HE Chief Justice of the United States has cautioned that "the high
cost of administration in bankruptcy is a matter of continuing con-
cern. Last year, more than twenty-six cents out of every dollar realized
in bankruptcy proceedings was used up in administrative costs and
represents an additional loss to creditors. Costs must be reduced if the
judiciary is to continue to administer the bankruptcy system."' This re-
emphasis of the "economical spirit of the Act" highlights a significant
area of conflict between the bench and the bar-the allowance of fees.-
A substantial portion of administration expenses is necessarily and
properly required for attorneys' fees.' The problem is not so much who
should be compensated, but, rather, how mu,.ch should be received for
the services rendered. The Bankruptcy Act does not establish any set
schedule of fees,4 but, to the contrary, is particularly vague in this area
of allowances in bankruptcy and Chapter XI cases. All that can be said
* Referee in Bankruptcy, Eastern District of New York.
1. Address by Chief Justice Earl Warren, Administration of the Federal Courts, 41st
Annual Meeting of the American Law Institute, Week of May 17, 1964, in N.Y.L.J., May 27,
1964, p. 4, col. 2. The Chief Justice noted that one possible solution which has been advanced
is to create an agency, such as the Alien Property Custodian, to aid in the administration of
bankruptcy proceedings.
2. Charles Elihu Nadler, a noted authority on bankruptcy administration, has argued
that it should not be the attorneys who feel the bite of the spirit of economy. He noted that
the rationale behind this spirit of economy is that, if less is paid to the attorneys, more .ill
be available for distribution to creditors. However, it was pointed out that what the courts
fail to realize is that it is not the attorneys who are responsible for the poor financial
condition of the bankrupt or debtor. If anyone at all is at fault, then that blame must fall
upon the creditors (whose careless or negligent extensions of credit created the difficulty), and,
therefore, they should rightfully bear the brunt of the costs in the administration. Fially,
Nadler predicted that, if the courts persist in their parsimonious attitude, then the capable
and respected attorneys will be forced to abandon bankruptcy practice altogether. Nadler,
Fallacies in Judicial Attitudes Towards Legal Fees in Bankruptcy, 5 Com. L.J. 305, 307-03
(1953).
3. In 1964, attorneys' fees accounted for over 40% of the total costs and expenses of
administration in bankruptcy proceedings. Administrative Office of the United States Court,
Bankruptcy Costs Studies, Memorandum No. 1 (Supp. I, July 12, 1965). See generally
Rudin, Allowances in Chapter XI Proceedings, Proceedings of Second Seminar for Referees
in Bankruptcy 39 (1965); Snedecor, Fees and Allowances in Straight Bankruptcy, Proceedings
of Second Seminar for Referees in Bankruptcy 27 (1965).
4. In re Charles Ray Glass, Inc., 47 F. Supp. 423 (SJ). Cal. 1942).
S. Although the act directs close judicial supervision of administration costs in bankruptcy
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is that the quantum of compensation is placed within the sound dis-
cretion of the court,6 which discretion must be exercised within the frame-
work of the various provisions of the act and the General Orders. The
perplexing problem facing the referee is the extent to which the ordinary
measure of legal fees7 should be disallowed in an attempt to abide by the
spirit of economy. Economy should not foreclose just compensation; 8
fees must not be set so low as to discourage the active participation of
able attorneys.9 Yet, the court must be vigilant in avoiding the exercise
of "vicarious generosity"'" and bear in mind the interests of the creditors.
It is within the ambit of these competing policies that the referee must
make his decision.
I. STRAIGHT BANKRUPTCY
A. Attorney for the Bankrupt and the Petitioning Creditors
Section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act includes among the items of costs
and expenses "one reasonable attorney's fee, for the professional services
actually rendered ... to the petitioning creditors . . . ."' The services
rendered by the attorney to the petitioning creditors are usually limited
in scope' 2 and time, and, except when necessary to try issues raised by
an answer to an involuntary petition, command modest compensation."
proceedings by specifying safeguards and precautions, allowances are covered in greater detail
only in Chapter X cases.
6. In re Lustron Corp., 196 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1952) ; Commerce Trust Co. v. Aylward,
145 F.2d 113 (8th Cir. 1944); In re Owl Drug Co., 16 F. Supp. 139 (D. Nev. 1936), aff'd
sub nom. Cohn v. Edler, 90 F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1937).
7. It is said that fees in bankruptcy cases cannot be as substantial as those received for
similar services in private practice. In re Owl Drug Co., supra note 6, at 144.
8. "[T]he laborer is worthy of his hire." Luke 10:7.
9. Cf. In re Osofsky, 50 F.2d 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
10. In re Gilbert, 276 U.S. 294, 296 (1928) ; see Realty Associates Sec. Corp. v. O'Connor,
295 U.S. 295 (1935). It has also been suggested that referees should avoid vicarious parsimony.
In the Matter of The Dole Co., 244 F. Supp. 751, 753 (NJ). Me. 1965).
11. Bankruptcy Act 64a, 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1)
(1964). Section 64 gives priority to the costs of administration, while § 62a(1) authorizes
the allowance of these costs and expenses of administration. 60 Stat. 329 (1946), 11 U.S.C.
§ 102(a) (1) (1964). For a discussion of the fees allowed to the attorney for the petitioning
creditors, see Snedecor, supra note 3, at 32-33.
12. These services are usually confined to preparing the involuntary petition and pro-
curing the adjudication of the bankrupt. E.g., Calhoun v. Stratton, 61 F.2d 302 (6th Cir.
1932); In re Consolidated Factors Corp., 59 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1932). In cases where the
trustee or receiver is not immediately appointed, the attorney's services may be expanded to
include examinations of the bankrupt and the witnesses. See Herzog, Fees and Allowances
in Bankruptcy, 36 Conn. B.J. 374, 387-88 (1962). These services could properly be considered
to aid in the administration of the estate.
13. In the Southern District of New York, the fees of the attorneys for the petitioning
creditors generally run between $125 and $250. Herzog, supra note 12, at 388.
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These services terminate with the entry of the order of adjudication."4
Section 64 also provides for allowances to the attorney for the bank-
rupt. Even though the services are performed for the bankrupt, the
attorney will be compensated only for those legal services of a profes-
sional nature which aid in the administration of the estate.Ys Thus, he
will be compensated for services which were reasonably necessary and
rendered in aiding the bankrupt in preparing his schedules of assets and
liabilities and such other statutory duties which he may perform,", such
as attendance at the first meeting of creditors. Pursuant to section 60d of
the act,17 any payment by the debtor directly to his attorney, for ser-
vices rendered prior to the filing of the petition, can be re-e-xamined by the
court on the petition of the trustee, any creditor of the bankrupt, or the
court on its own motion. The payment will be valid only to the extent
of a reasonable amount as determined by the referee, and any excess
will be returned to the estate.' s
The fact that the attorney voluntarily aids the receiver or trustee in
his duties does not entitle the attorney to any additional compensation; 19
nor will he receive an allowance for the unsuccessful attempt to resist
an involuntary petition."° Likewise, services rendered in aiding the
debtor in obtaining his discharge" or in defending him against charges
of fraud are not compensable since they do not aid in the administration
of the estate.'
The weight of authority is to the effect that prior fruitless efforts to
effect an arrangement under Chapter XI of the act, a composition or
14. Calhoun v. Stratton, 61 F.2d 302, 303 (6th Cir. 1932); Mlore & Tyson v. Ir ing-Pitt
Mfg. Co, 13 F.2d 692, 695 (8th Cir. 1927); cf. In re Eureka Upholstering Co, 43 F.2d 95
(2d Cir. 1931).
15. In re Herald-Post, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1937). General Order 42, 11 U.S.C.
App. (1964), provides: "No allowance of compensation shall be made to any attorney for a
receiver, trustee or debtor in possession except for professional service'."
The concept that the services must be beneficial to or aid in the administration of the
estate was set forth by the Supreme Court in 1903 in the landmark case of Randolph v.
Scruggs, 190 U.S. 533, 533-39 (1903).
16. In re Geiser Mlfg. Co., 23 F. Supp. 432, 434 (A.D. Pa. 193S); In re Higin Mfg. Co,
19 F. Supp. 120, 122 (El). Ky. 1937). But see Herzog, supra note 12, at 3M9.
17. Bankruptcy Act § 60d, 77 Stat. 14 (1963), 11 U.S.C. § 96(d) (1964).
18. Ibid. See Quinn v. Union Nat'l Bank, 32 F.2d 762, 765 (3th Cir. 1929).
19. In re Eureka Upholstering Co., 43 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1931).
20. In re Evenod Perfumer, Inc., 67 F.2d 87S (2d Cir. 1933), cert. denied, 291 US. 671
(1934).
21. Lewis v. Fitzgerald, 295 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 US. 828 (1962);
In re Owl Drug Co., 16 F. Supp. 139 (D. Nev. 1936), aff'd sub nom. Cohn v. Edler, 90
F.2d 823 (9th Cir. 1937).
22. In re Owl Drug Co., supra note 21, at 145.
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debt extension, are not compensable as an administrative claim. How-
ever, In the Matter of Knickerbocker Leather & Novelty Co. 4 appears
to be a rejection of that principle. There, the attorney for the bankrupt
petitioned for the fixing of fees for services rendered in attempting to
obtain approval and confirmation of a plan of reorganization under
Chapter XI. The referee considered only those services rendered in con-
nection with the filing of the petition, refusing to consider the other
services performed and set forth in the application. These services in-
cluded efforts to obtain financing which was essential for the approval
and confirmation of the plan.25
The district court, in modifying the referee's order, noted that "the
Referee did not hold, as petitioner seems to argue, that petitioner could
not ever be compensated for his services to the then debtor between
February 8th and May 15th, 1956. He merely held that allowance for
such services must await an application therefor . ". . . " The court of
appeals, in its per curiam affirmance, stated that "the order, of course,
did not purport to preclude an application for an allowance as an expense
of the administration of the estate.
27
This conclusion appears to be in conflict with the earlier decisions, 8 as
well as with the test in the Bankruptcy Act. Whether or not particular
services are compensable is governed by the act, 20 and there is no provi-
sion in the bankruptcy sections which specifically authorizes the allow-
ance of fees for unsuccessful attempts to have a plan of arrangement
confirmed. Similarly, it is provided that, in fixing allowances under
Chapter XI, "the court shall give consideration only to the services which
contributed to the arrangement confirmed or to the refusal of con-
firmation of an arrangement, or which were beneficial in the administra-
tion of the estate, and the proper costs and expenses incidental thereto
.... ,,3o Congressional intent to deny compensation to the attorney in
an unsuccessful Chapter XI proceeding becomes even clearer in light of
the amendments to Chapters X 3 ' and XII8 made by the Chandler Act
23. In re Kinnane Co.'s Estate, 242 Fed. 769 (6th Cir. 1917) ; In re Geiser Mfg. Co., 23
F. Supp. 482 (M.D. Pa. 1938); In re Higgin Mfg. Co., 19 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Ky. 1937).
24. 158 F. Supp. 236 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Haar v. Oseland, 265
F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1959).
25. 158 F. Supp. at 237.
26. Ibid.
27. 265 F.2d at 219.
28. See cases cited note 23 supra.
29. Lane v. Haytian Corp. of America, 117 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S.
580 (1941) ; In re Realty Associates Sec. Corp., 69 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 292
U.S. 628 (1934).
30. Bankruptcy Act § 337(2), 72 Stat. 821 (1958), 11 U.S.C. § 737(2) (1964).
31. Bankruptcy Act § 246, 52 Stat. 901 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 646 (1964).
32. Bankruptcy Act § 495, 52 Stat. 926 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 895 (1964).
[Vol. 34
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of 1938. By virtue of these amendments, the court is empowered to
"allow reasonable compensation for services rendered"33 in abortive
Chapter X and XII proceedings. The absence of similar provisions in
the straight bankruptcy sections and in Chapter X of the act seems,
therefore, to preclude the allowance of any such compensation, and thus
requires a holding contrary to the result indicated by the dictum in the
Knickerbocker case.
B. Attorney for the Receiver and Trustee
Although the attorneys for the receiver 14 or trustee have the greatest
responsibility in preserving, increasing, and administering the estate,
there is no specific statutory authorization for compensating them. Their
compensation is considered, therefore, to be part of the "costs and ex-
penses of administration" as provided in section 64a(1) . The attorney
will receive compensation only for services which are of a professional
nature, and not for ministerial or clerical tasks."I Since only the court
can fix the fee after appropriate notice to creditors,37 retainers to the
attorney for the trustee or contingent fee contracts are not permitted in
straight bankruptcy cases.ns
Interim allowances may be granted in a proper case, 9 even though
there are no express provisions relating thereto. Generally, such allow-
ances will be awarded only in cases where large estates are involved which
require an extended period of time for liquidation and settlement. The
application for the allowance usually covers services which already have
been rendered, but may include, in certain cases, charges for reasonably
anticipated services.4 1
33. Bankruptcy Act §§ 246, 495, 52 Stat. 901, 926 (1933), 11 U.S.C. §§ 646, S95 (1964).
34. Since the duties of receivers have been increased by the Chandler Act of 1933, their
need for legal serxices, therefore, has correspondingly increased. See General Order 40, 11
U.S.C. App. (1964); 3 Collier, Bankruptcy 62.12[3J, at 1475-76 (14th ed. 1964) [berein-
after cited as Collier].
35. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(1), 76 Stat. 571 (1962), 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1) (1964).
36. Connelly v. Hancock, Dorr, Ryan & Shove, 195 F.2d S64 (2d Cir. 1952); In re Union
Dredging Co., 225 Fed. 123 (D. Del. 1915); In re Eureka Upholstering Co., 43 F.2d 95 (2d
Cir. 1931) (dictum). Often, there is great difficulty in drawing the line between compemable
professional services and non-compensable clerical services. See In re S.R. Stern Lab:;, Inc.,
Bank. No. 92726 (S.D.N.Y. June 17, 1959).
37. Bankruptcy Act § 58, 52 Stat. S67 (1933), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 94 (1964).
38. Wratkins v. Sedberry, 261 U.S. 571, 574-75 (1923).
39. Connelly v. Hancock, Dorr, Ryan & Shove, 195 F.2d 364, S6S-69 (2d Cir. 1952) ; In re
Paramount-Publix Corp., 10 F. Supp. 504, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1934). It should be noted that
any interim allowances paid are subject to reconsideration by the court. See 3 Collier
§ 62.12[7], at 1506 n.94.
40. In re Paramount-PublKx Corp., 10 F. Supp. 504, 510-11 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
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II. CHAPTER XI PROCEEDINGS
It has been noted that Chapter XI makes only oblique reference to
the subject of allowances. Therefore, it is necessary to review the entire
act and the General Orders to find guidance on the subject.4 1
The act requires the court to fix a time within which the debtor shall
deposit the money necessary to pay the costs and expenses of the
proceeding and the expenses incurred by the creditors' committee, in-
cluding fees and expenses of its attorneys, accountants, and agents. 42
Further, the court is authorized to fix the amount of compensation to be
paid to the distributor." The act also grants priority to the "costs and
expenses of administration,"44 which, of course, include allowances for
services rendered by the attorneys. Moreover, the General Orders contem-
plate the allowance of fees to attorneys for the receiver and/or the
debtor in possession.45
A. Attorney for the Debtor and the Debtor in Possession
Normally, only one attorney is chosen to represent the debtor in both
of his capacities, i.e., as the debtor and as the debtor in possession. That
no distinction should be made as to what capacity he has served in is
evidenced by the fact that the attorney files only one application for
allowances, which lists all of the services rendered in both capacities. 40
The attorney for the debtor and the debtor in possession occupies a
position analogous to that of the attorney for the bankrupt and the at-
torney for the trustee in a straight bankruptcy proceeding: It is upon
him that the bulk of the work falls. His duties include, for example,
preparation of the petition and schedules, achieving confirmation of the
plan of arrangement, and advising his client in both the Chapter XI
proceedings and in the operation of the corporation's business activities.
The fee of the attorney for the debtor and the debtor in possession is,
therefore, often substantial, since it is he who will usually be responsible
for the ultimate success of the proceeding. 47 Generally, the same criteria
utilized in straight bankruptcy cases should also be used in Chapter XI
cases in determining the amount of the allowance.48
There are no longer any grounds for disputing that the compensation
of the attorney for the debtor is to be determined by the court.40 Any
41. Herzog, Bankruptcy Law-Modern Trends, 37 Ref. J. 110 (1963).
42. Bankruptcy Act § 337(2), 72 Stat. 821 (1958), 11 U.S.C. § 737(2) (1964).
43. Bankruptcy Act § 337(1), 52 Stat. 908 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 737(1) (1964).
44. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(1), 76 Stat. 571 (1962), 11 US.C. § 104(a) (1) (1964).
45. General Orders 42, 44, 11 U.S.C. App. (1964).
46. Herzog, supra note 41, at 112.
47. Ibid.
48. See notes 84-88 infra and accompanying text.
49. In re Preston, 89 F. Supp. 866 (S.D.N.Y. 1950). In Preston, the attorney had
[Vol. 34
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fee paid by the debtor directly to his attorney is reviewable by the court
since section 60d has been made applicable to Chapter XI proceedings
by section 302.50
B. Attorney for the Creditors' Committee
The policy of the Bankruptcy Act dictates that compensation be
denied unless expressly provided for in the act.Y' Since no provision is
made for the payment of fees to counsel for the creditors' committee in
a straight bankruptcy proceeding, compensation generally will be denied. 2
However, there is express authority in the act for allowances to attorneys
for creditors' committees in Chapter X1 proceedings. Section 337 requires
a deposit of money to pay the "necessary expenses (including fees and
expenses of attorneys, accountants and agents) ... incurred after [the
attorney's] ... appointment by a committee appointed pursuant to sec-
tion 338 of this Act ....
This section was strictly construed in the case of Lane v. Haytian Corp.
of America, 4 where allowances were denied to an vnofficial creditors'
committee and its attorney in a Chapter M proceeding. The court noted
that the provisions of the act allow compensation only to an official
committee of creditors and that the compensable duties of this com-
mittee are limited to examining the plan proposed by the debtor and
advising the general creditors whether the plan should be accepted or
rejected. 5 Services rendered by the committee before their official ap-
pointment aimed at aiding the debtor in formulating or achieving accept-
ance of the plan are not compensable since the committee and its attorney
are representatives only of the creditors and not of the debtor.ri
Some ten years after the Lane case, section 337(2) was amended to
allow for payment of attorney's fees incurred "before or after the filing
petitioned for $2,500 as fees for services rendered in formulating and gaining acceptance of
the plan of arrangement. The referee disallowed a substantial part of the Claim. On the
appeal, the attorney contended that the referee was without power to pass upon the fee =Inco
§ 337(2) makes no reference to the attorney for the debtor. Id. at S67-63. Section 337(2)
authorizes the referee to set only the fee of the attorney for the creditors' committee. The
court dismissed this contention and found that § 64a, which authorizes the court to pass upon
the fees paid by the debtor to his attorney, has been incorporated into Chapter XI proceed-
ings by § 302 of the act. Id. at 86S-69.
50. Bankruptcy Act § 302, 52 Stat. 905 (193S), 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1964).
51. Lane v. Haytian Corp. of America, 117 F.2d 216, 219 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 US.
580 (1941); In re Realty Associates Sec. Corp., 69 F.2d 41, 43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 292
U.S. 623 (1934); Nisonoff v. Irving Trust Co., 63 F.2d 32, 34 (2d Cir. 1933).
52. In re Realty Associates Sec. Corp., supra note 51, at 42.
53. Bankruptcy Act § 337(2), 72 Stat. 321 (1953), 11 U.S.C. § 737(2) (1964).
54. 117 F2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.. 50 (1941).
55. 117 F.2d at 221.
56. Ibid.
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of the petition... by a committee designated in writings, filed with the
court and signed and acknowledged by a majority in amount of un-
secured creditors . . . .,, In fixing the allowance, the court is directed
to give consideration only "to the services which contributed to the ar-
rangement confirmed or to the refusal of confirmation of an arrangement,
or which were beneficial in the administration of the estate, and the
proper costs and expenses incidental thereto .. 0.8.I'
Under the extremely broad amendatory language of this section, ser-
vices which in any manner tend towards the confirmation of the arrange-
ment are now compensable, thus overruling Lane v. Haytian Corp. of
America" in this respect. The duties of the creditors' committee have
been greatly expanded, and now may properly include, for example,
scrutinizing and supervising the operations of the debtor in possession,
approving or disapproving orders submitted to the court for signature,
advising the court with regard to the limitation of purchases, the handling
of moneys, and the hiring and firing of employees.00
It seems clear from the text of the act that, if the arrangement aborts,
counsel for the committee receives no compensation unless it was through
his efforts that the confirmation was denied. This result follows both
from the quoted portion of section 337(2) set forth above and from sec-
tion 64a(3).11 The latter section provides that, where "confirmation of an
arrangement ... has been refused, revoked, or set aside upon the objec-
tion and through the efforts and at the cost and expense of one or more
[of the] creditors .. . the reasonable costs and expenses [incurred by
these] . . . creditors in obtaining such refusal, revocation, or setting
aside . . ." should be paid. 2
The phrase which appears in section 33 7 (2), "or which were beneficial
in the administration of the estate, '0 3 can only mean those services which
result in the enhancement of the assets of the estate in one form or
57. Bankruptcy Act § 337(2), 66 Stat. 432 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 737(2) (1964), amending
52 Stat. 908 (1938).
58. Ibid.
59. 117 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 580 (1941). Of course, compensation will
not be allowed for services which were not of a legal nature. Nor can the 1952 amendment
be read to imply that the attorney for the creditors' committee can now assume the duties
of the attorney for the debtor in possession. It is still the latter's primary duty to prepare
the plan of arrangement, and, if the attorney for the creditors' committee voluntarily assumes
this responsibility, he will not receive any allowance. The Lane case has not been overruled in
this respect.
60. See Rudin, Allowances in Chapter XI Proceedings, Proceedings of Second Seminar for
Referees in Bankruptcy 39, 45 (1965).
61. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(3), 52 Stat. 874 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(3)
(1964).
62. Ibid.
63. Bankruptcy Act § 337(2), 72 Stat. 821 (1958), 11 U.S.C. & 737(2) (1964).
[Vol. 34
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another. Examples of this would be the institution of proceedings to
invalidate liens, the setting aside of fraudulent transfers, and the recovery
of preferentially transferred property. In no other way can the creditor
render services which are "beneficial in the administration of the estate."G4
III. THE THRUST OF SECTION 60D
The 1963 amendment to section 60d" has thrust the referee squarely
and actively into the process of fee allowances. Under the new section,
the referee can now, on the petition of either the trustee or any creditor,
or on his own motion, review the fees paid to attorneys in both bank-
ruptcy and Chapter XI proceedings. The purpose of the amendment was
to provide adequate protection for the creditors and the bankrupt or
debtor from excessive attorney's fees, inasmuch as lawyers are often
hesitant to challenge the reasonableness of their colleagues' fees.cO
The duty which devolves upon the referee cannot and should not be
avoided even if the debtor and creditors are in agreement. 7 In a straight
64. Herzog, supra note 41, at 114. The case of Technical Color & Chem. Workr, Inc. v.
Two Guys from 'Massmpequa, Inc., 327 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1964), is an extraordinary example
of services rendered by a creditor's attorney which were beneficial to the etate. The debtor's
plan of arrangement bad been approved by the creditors. Upon submission of the plan to
the court, the creditor's attorney objected to the confirmation on the grounds that it v.as
not in the best interests of the creditors. It was alleged that many of the claims against the
estate were without merit and that the debtor had made several fraudulent convey-ancin and
preferences. If all the allegations were true, the net result would have been that the creditors
would receive over 60% of the face value of their claims upon liquidation, rather than the
proposed 33%. The court of appeals held that the lower court should have held a full
hearing on the petition, and, if the allegations were found to be true, the court should then
refuse confirmation.
65. "If a debtor shall, directly or indirectly, in contemplation of the filing of a petition
by or against him, pay money or transfer property to an attorney at law, for cervices
rendered or to be rendered, the transaction may be examined by the court on its own motion
or shall be examined by the court on petition of the trustee or any creditor and shall be
held valid only to the extent of a reasonable amount to be determined by the court, and the
excess may be recovered by the trustee for the benefit of the estate.
"If, whether before or after filing, a debtor shall agree orally or in writing to pay money or
transfer property to an attorney at law after the filing, the transaction may be examined by
the court on its own motion or shall be examined by the court on petition of the bankrupt
made prior to discharge and shall be held valid only to the extent of a reasonable amount
to be determined by the court, and any excess obligation shall be canceled, or if exce.es
payment or transfer has been made, returned to the bankrupt" Bankruptcy Act § CVd, 77
Stat. 14 (1963), 11 U.S.C. § 96(d) (1964), amending 52 Stat. S70 (1938).
66. S. Rep. No. 144, SSth Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1963). In the House Report to the amend-
ment, it was noted that it often "matters very little to a bankrupt whether his attorney's
fee is large or small since it will be paid out of assets which in any event will normally
be completely consumed in distribution." H.R. Rep. No. 99, SSth Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1963).
67. In the Matter of Seed Marketing Ass'n, 223 F. Supp. S12, 813, 823 (D. Neb. 1964);
In re Goodman, 17 F. Supp. 337, 338 (W.D.N.Y. 1936); see In the Matter of The Dole Co.,
244 F. Supp. 751 (NJ). Mle. 1965).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
bankruptcy proceeding, the amount awarded as counsel fees diminishes
to that extent the amount available for distribution to creditors. In a
Chapter XI proceeding, any reduction in the amount requested reverts
to the debtor. Even if the debtor is content to let his attorney's request
for allowance stand and the creditors raise no objection, the court must
keep the fees reasonable in conformity with the policy of economy re-
quired by the act, and thus improve the debtor's financial condition and
expedite his eventual rehabilitation.
Only fees paid by the bankrupt to his attorney in contemplation of
bankruptcy are summarily reviewable by the court under section 60d.18
On a motion to examine, there are two distinct questions presented to
the court. The first, pertaining to jurisdiction, is whether the payment
was made in contemplation of bankruptcy;', and the second is whether
the payment was reasonable.7" To establish "contemplation of bank-
ruptcy," the court must determine what the bankrupt's state of mind
was at the time of the payment." The thought of liquidation must be
the "impelling cause of the payment.". 2 "Contemplation" is, therefore,
broadly defined as having the possibility of liquidation in mind as dis-
tinguished from the narrower definition of having the actual intent to
file a petition. 3 Thus, in the leading case of Conrad, Rubin & Lesser
v. Pender74 the Supreme Court held that payments made by the bank-
rupt to his attorneys for conducting negotiations with creditors for
extensions of time, and thereby attempting to avoid bankruptcy, were
subject to review under section 60d, since "negotiations to prevent bank-
ruptcy may demonstrate that the thought of bankruptcy was the impelling
cause of the payment. ' 75
Although the referee may review any fees paid by the debtor, if the
attorney receives his fee from a third party, the court is without authority
to examine the reasonableness of the fee,76 unless it appears that the
debtor has obligated himself to repay the amount to the third person
68. Conrad, Rubin & Lesser v. Fender, 289 U.S. 472 (1933); In re Wood & Henderson,
210 U.S. 246 (1908).
69. Conrad, Rubin & Lesser v. Pender, 289 U.S. 472 (1933); see 3 Collier ff 60.69. It Is
the contemplation of the bankrupt, not his attorney, which is requisite. Tripp v. Mltschrlcb,
211 Fed. 424 (8th Cir. 1914).
70. For the criteria used in determining reasonableness, see pp. 397-400 infra.
71. Conrad, Rubin & Lesser v. Pender, 289 U.S. 472, 477 (1933).
72. Id. at 479.
73. Id. at 478-79.
74. 289 U.S. 472 (1933).
75. Id. at 479.
76. In re Star Brand Prods. & Pickle Co., 96 F. Supp. 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); In re
A.L. Ratner, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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after confirmation of the plan in Chapter X.77 This situation has been
criticized as presenting a threat that unreasonable and unconscionable
fees may be coerced from the debtor in return for the approval of the
arrangement. 8 In a proceeding under Chapter X of the act, the court
is expressly given the right to determine the reasonableness of fees paid
by third parties.79 A bill, recently introduced into the House of Represen-
tatives by Congressman Celler, would amend Chapter XI to have it con-
form with Chapter X in this respect.8 0 The deternination of the referee
in fixing the compensation, if free from errors of law, ought not to be
disturbed, unless it is clearly unsupported by the evidence." Moreover,
the two-year limitation imposed by the act within which the receiver or
trustee must institute proceedings on behalf of the estate does not bind
the referee in the exercise of his powers under section 60d.12
IV. QUANTUM OF COMPENSATION
As in any case involving fees, the best that the court can hope to do is to come
within the area of reasonableness, not so high as to be overgenerous and unconscionable
and not so low as to fail to recognize the importance of the role played by the ...
attorney.8 3
Different courts have enunciated and emphasized different standards
that should be used in attempting to reach this area of reasonableness.
Few questions in bankruptcy administration have been as persistently
litigated as those relating to fees; the reported cases are manifold. In
one of the most widely cited decisions on the subject, In re Owl Drug
Co., 4 the court, in an exhaustive opinion, enumerated several criteria
which are now traditionally used in determining the reasonableness of
fees. These factors are: (1) the time consumed; (2) the intricacy of
the legal problems involved; (3) the relative size of the estate and the
amount available for distribution; (4) the quality of the opposition en-
countered; (5) the results achieved (salvage theory); and (6) the ethics
of the profession."5 The court then noted that any determination is, of
course, subject to the economical spirit of the act:
77. Lane v. Haytian Corp. of America, 117 F.2d 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 US.
5SO (1941).
78. Herzog, supra note 41, at 113.
79. Bankruptcy Act § 221(4), 52 Stat. 897 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 621(4) (1964).
80. H.R. 5645, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
S1. E.g., Roth v. Reich, 164 F.2d 305, 311 (2d Cir. 1947); Matter of Valentine,
139 F. Supp. 576, 577 (D. Md. 1956).
82. Levin & Weintraub v. Rosenberg, 330 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1964).
83. Herzog, supra note 41, at 111.
84. 16 F. Supp. 139 (D. Nev. 1936), aff'd sub nom. Cohn v. Edler, 90 F2d 023 (9th
Cir. 1937).
85. 16 F. Supp. at 142. For the ethical considerations, EeC ABA, Canons of Profezzonal
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We must, nevertheless, bear in mind the fact that, in view of the policy of economy
of the Bankruptcy Act, allowances for such fees cannot and should not approximate
what attorneys might or would receive, under similar circumstances, for services to
private persons.80
Probably the most significant factor to be used in determining the amount
of the allowance is the referee's own knowledge and experience with
respect to the value of the services.8" Consideration should be given to
the entire spectrum of economic facts, including cost of living, compara-
tive value of similar services in private practice, etc.88
As we have already seen, 9 the services rendered by the attorney for
the bankrupt and the attorney for the petitioning creditors are limited
in scope, and, therefore, compensation will generally be limited.2I How-
ever, the above criteria should be used in determining the fees of the other
attorneys, upon whom the burden of administration falls.
Recent cases fixing allowances, especially in the Second Circuit, have
laid great, if not undue, stress upon the time element. Chief Judge Lum-
bard, writing for the court in In the Matter of Hudson & M.R.R.,01 issued
this stern warning to the Bar:
We wish to emphasize that any attorney who hopes to obtain an allowance from the
court should keep accurate and current records of work done and time spent. Lawyers
are well aware that, especially where services of the nature here involved are spread
over a period of time and ultimate payment is virtually assured, they are valued
principally on the basis of the time required. There is no excuse for an established
law firm to rely on estimates made on the eve of payment and almost entirely un-
supported by daily records or for it to expect a court to do so.9 2
One year later, the Second Circuit strongly reiterated its position in
In the Matter of the Wal-Feld Co.9' The attorneys had requested com-
pensation of 25,000 dollars, based on 1,150 hours of work. The court, in
affirming the order below which had awarded the attorneys 11,000
dollars,94 noted that, since daily time sheets had not been kept, the at-
torneys could not receive the full amount requested."8 The attorneys had
Ethics, Canon 12; Feibelman, The Allowance and Reasonableness of Attorneys' Fees In
Bankruptcy, 15 Bus. Law. 889, 894-95 (1960).
86. 16 F. Supp. at 144. (Emphasis omitted.)
87. Roth v. Reich, 164 F.2d 305, 311 (2d Cir. 1947).
88. Referee Herzog warns that, if the courts allow fees to fall so low as to make bank-
ruptcy practice unprofitable, and the practice falls into the hands of the unscrupulous, the
creditors will pay doubly for this "tarnished administration" of bankruptcy administration.
Herzog, Fees and Allowances in Bankruptcy, 36 Conn. B.J. 374, 377-78 (1962).
89. See notes 12-14 supra and accompanying text.
90. See note 13 supra.
91. 339 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1964).
92. Id. at 115.
93. 345 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1965).
94. This constituted approximately $10 per hour.
95. Id. at 677.
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sought to support their petition for allowance by the fact that, of the
83,000 dollars received by the estate, 59,000 dollars came from three set-
tlements negotiated by them. The court found, however, that this success
in enriching the estate did not excuse the firm from keeping detailed time
records, and that a request for an allowance cannot be supported by a
bare allegation of the total number of hours worked.0 One commentator
has noted that the success in the Wal-Feld case "brought only a pat on
the back, which may give satisfaction but contributes nothing to the
overhead of maintaining the modern law office.2* 7
Any elevation of the time factor leads to unrealistic results and diffi-
culties of administration. Is an experienced, expert, quick-thinking bank-
ruptcy lawyer to be penalized because it takes him less time than a
beginner, or an equally competent but slower-moving colleague? To
stress the time factor is to
disregard that much of the attorney's work is cerebral; that a brilliant idea vwhich
may flash into an attorney's mind may be worth more than a thousand hours of
routine services which require no particular acumen: that some minds w~ork swifter
than others; that the -work performed may be ordinary or extraordinary, even spec-
tacular; that the vork could be performed cheaper, if not better, by a clerk or junior.P
A narrow, mechanistic application of the time test would require the
referee to analyze and to evaluate the time properly spent on the case-a
truly Herculean task. In addition, the temptation to exaggerate on a
time-clock approach is almost overwhelming. "A five-minute telephone
call becomes a fifteen-minute conference, and a thirty-minute informal
discussion becomes a two-hour conference." ' The time factor which is
considered, therefore, must be limited to the time that should be required
to deal with the case rather than the time actually spent.1
Accomplishments and benefits to the estate, rather than the time factor,
should be the determining elements in fixing allowances, and numerous
courts have effected this by placing primary reliance on this "salvage
theory." As results and achievements determine compensation in the
business world, so also should the fees be measured by the extent of
success.
01
The rationale behind this salvage theory was well stated by the court
in the early case of In re Osofsky:'102
In bankruptcy cases, however, there seems .. .to be another element which has
96. Ibid.
97. Herzog, Fees and Allowances-The Time-Clock Approach, in N.Y.L.J., Oct. 25, 1965,
p. 4, col. 1. (Footnote omitted.)
98. Id. at 4, col. 1.
99. Ibid.
100. In re Jacellen Realty Corp., Bankr. L. Rep. 1 54,37S (S.DN.Y. 1943).
101. In re Hoffman, 173 Fed. 234 (E.D. Wis. 1909).
102. 50 F.2d 925 (S.D..Y. 1931).
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to be considered. That is the fact that in bankruptcy very often futile quests for
assets have to be made. Many times, however much ingenuity and time attorneys
may expend, they may not be able to get anything for the estate by their efforts.
It is then a question, as in salvage at sea, of no cure, no pay.
When the efforts of attorneys cause a material increase in the bankruptcy estate,
or, as here, create it, they should be well rewarded; otherwise there will not be any
incentive to attorneys to put forth their best efforts in cases which appear un-
promising.10 3
There can be little quarrel with such a formulation as applied to a case
such as Osofsky, where virtually the entire estate was created by the
attorneys' efforts in instituting and settling suits to set aside fraudulent
transfers. In Osofsky, the court allowed the attorneys approximately
one-third of the amounts recovered. However, if an estate has been created
by ordinary liquidation, and the attorneys' services to the estate were of
a routine nature, a much smaller fee would be indicated.
Thus, as a matter of policy, it seems to be unwise to elevate the time
factor over the element of success as measured by the benefit to the
estate. The facts of life require that attorneys in insolvency proceedings
be adequately compensated where the funds of the estate were created
by their efforts, and their efforts alone. The thrust of the Wal-Feld case
and the Hudson & M.R.R. case can be harmonized, if at all, with the
earlier decisions which emphasized this salvage theory, only on the basis
that these two courts considered the enrichment of the estate to be the
result of services rendered which were of a routine and ordinary nature.
V. CONCLUSION
"The granting of allowances in bankruptcy involves a complex amal-
gamation of consideration [s] which can be only imperfectly sketched
out."'01 4 In approaching this task and in promoting the public policy of
encouraging attorneys to use their best efforts on behalf of the estate,
the element of benefit to the estate should be given primacy. The other
factors should, of course, be considered in arriving at a result. Very
often, however, a proper consideration of the case under the salvage
theory will implicitly reflect, to a great extent, many of these other
factors. Which factor should receive prime consideration will, of course,
depend upon the facts of the particular case.
It is relatively easy for the courts to formulate the governing rules
and criteria-the difficulty is encountered in applying these rules. It is
submitted that the surest route to the "area of reasonableness" in allow-
ances is the methodical and painstaking application of these multiple
factors.
103. Id. at 927.
104. Herzog, supra note 97, at 4, col. 2. (Footnote omitted.)
